Non-price competition has been generally recognized as an important feature of oligopolistic industries. When the decision variables for each fiirm comprise not merely the quantity of output but also product quality, all of these choices present the usual oligopolistic interactions. Since the costs of enforcing a collusive decision will generally differ with respect to different choice variables, a variety of equilibria is conceivable, with collusion in some dimensions and competition in others. There are important related policy problems.
It is often thought that non-price competition is excessively indulged in by firms in an industry (like the airlines) which successfully enforces price (or quantity) collusion. It has recently been mooted that increased competitiveness will bring benefits if legal and medical professions are allowed to advertise. I'Hiile such issues have a long history in the literature on industrial economics, there have been very few attempts to pin them down by setting up precise models.
Spence (1975) and Sheshinski (1976) have recently analyzed quality and quantity choices by a monopolist, and Spence (1977) has extended this work to the setting of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition. This work compares the socially optimum choices of quantity and quality, and the extent of product diversity, with those in the relevant market equilibrium. Biases are found to depend on whether a quality increase raises or lowers the elasticity of demand for each product line. However, these comparisons do not address themselves to the issues posed above, where the effect of collusion in one dimension on competition in another is sought. This paper seeks to do that.
We come up at once against another important choice variable, viz. the total number of products being produced in the industry. Non-price competition is regarded !iere in the sense of product quality.
Advertising affects tastes, and its welfare effects must be treated differently;
see Dixit and Norman (1976 
THE MODEL OUTLINED
The setting is very similar to that in Spence (1977) and Dixit and Norman (1976 c(x,z) = f + ax + bz (5) where f is the fixed cost, and a, b the respective constant marginal costs of quantity and quality.
Since the functional forms of (j) and c are assumed independent of i, optima or equilibria will be symmetric. VJhen a total of n products is active, with common levels x, z and p respectively for quantity, quality and price, we will have
and X = e -n c(x,z)
where e is the endowment of the numeraire.
Social optimum
The object here is to choose n, x and z to maximize utility
The first order conditions are easily seen to be G'(s) (f.(x,z) = c(x,z) (9) <^^(x,z)/ ()>(x,z) = c^(x,z)/ c(x,z) (10) and (}) 
We can interpret (10) and (11) as saying that x and z minimize c/^, the cost per unit of the contribution of each product to s. Then s is chosen to make its marginal benefit G'(s) equal to this cost.
It will prove useful to think in terms of a two-step procedure. Given The optimum can then be shown at the intersection of the two curves (12) and (14) in the (z,s) space, as done by Spence (1977) . This is the point in Figures 1 and 2, which appear later. ITie second order conditions are important in determining the shapes of the curves, but for sake of brevity they are not spelt out .
Market equilibri a
There are three variables to be determined-n, x and z -and the rules defining them depend on the market structure.
If n is collusively set, i.e.
entry is controlled, this could be done to maximize profit per product, This seems unrealistic and uninteresting for most relevant industries e.g. the professions. We therefore assume that G has an initial convex section followed by a concave one, and that the resulting choice of n is large enough to allow us to treat it as a continuous variable.
We then have the first order conditions between n, x and z is ambiguous.
-9 -For the social optimum, we can use (9) to rewrite (10) and (11) Sheshinski (1976) and Spence (1977) . However, this does not lead to any simple interpretable conditions, and any outcome of comparisons between the optimum and the collusive values of x and z seems possible.
We next consider the case where only entry is collusively controlled, and look at two possible kinds of equilibria.
Nash equilibrium
Given n, and regarding the impact of their decisions on s as negligibly small, individuals choose x and z to maximize tt. The first order conditions
These are just (18) and (19) looked at in a different way.
Given x and z, the collusive choice of n yields the first order condition G"(s) 4> x<l> =0 X These reduce to (17) -(19), so the Nash equilibrium with only entry collusively set coincides with the fully collusive solution.
Leader -follower equilibrium
Here, as before, the individuals choose x and z given n and regarding s fixed.
The (18) and (19) can be thought of as defining the reaction functions x(n) and z(n). The group takes these into account, so the choice of n yields the first order condition
Save in the exceptional case where the reaction functions are such that the first square bracket vanishes, this reduces to G"(s) = 0, and then the full set of equations defining the equilibrium is just (17) 
The coefficient matrix in the first term is negative definite by the second order conditions for the individuals' choice of x and z. Then at the group optimum value of n, we have G" = and therefore x' (n) = = z'(n).
Close to this point, G" will be small, and the full coefficient matrix will be dominated by the negative definite one above. Thus the sign of x'(n) or z'(n) is the same as that of G" , i.e. positive for n slightly too low and negative for n slightly too large. In other words, we expect both reaction functions to attain local maxima for the choice of n corresponding to the group optimum.
The intuitive reason can be seen by examining the expression (15) 
<c <1 (20) This allows some explicit solutions without altering any relevant qualitative features of the problem.
With iso-elastic (J), we have X <^(x,z) = a(z) 4>(x,z) (21) X in the notation of (4) , while iso-elastic G yields s G'(s) = (1-e) G(s) (22) The total profit becomes n = (1-g) a(z) G(s) -n c(x,z) (23) Monopolistic competiti on This follows Spence (1977 
Dividing (25) by (26) and using (13) , we find
The equilibrium occurs in (z,s) space at the intersection of the curves defined by (27) and (28) 
Full collusion
The first order conditions are Dividing (31) by (29), we have, using (13),
M (z) 1-e a(z)
The intersection of these is at B in Fip^ure 1 and 2.
Co llusion over entry and quanti ty Now n and x are chosen by the group to maximize IT given z, while z is chosen by the individuals to maximize tt given n and x, and neglecting the effect on s. The conditions for n and x are
(1-e) a G' Given x and z, the choice of n satisfies
Dividing (38) by (40) we find Comparing this with (32), the curve which was relevant for equilibria with full collusion or for entry and quantity collusion, we see that the right hand side of (42) as in the previous case. Using (22) in (46) and dividing by (45), we find a7a = (1-e) (c /c -4) 1^) Starting with full collusion and enforcing only quantity competition actually lowers welfare in this case.
-19 -IV.
CONCLUDING CO^IMENTS
In this paper we have considered several possible cases of oligopolistic equilibria and compared them with each other taking into account both positive and welfare aspects. The strategic variables were entry, quantity and quality, and different circumstances and objectives governing their choice produced the different possible equilibria. Since these circumstances are amenable to policy controls, we were able to draw some inferences as to desirable and undesirable controls over oligopolistic industries. Some of these conclusions were rather surprising in the light of previous casual thinking on the subject.
We would not claim such theorising to be infallible in its applications.
We are also aware that a great deal remains to be done. 
